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I. THE GLOBALIZATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY
A. Donegal v. Zambia: Vulture Funds in Africa
A 2007 U.K. court case involving Donegal, a private equity fund, and
the Republic of Zambia, has contributed to an ongoing debate about the
operation of so-called vulture funds in African and other developing
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countries.' Donegal sued Zambia for more than fifty-five million U.S.
dollars in connection with a debt owed by Zambia to Romania for Zambia's
acquisition of agricultural machinery from Romania pursuant to a credit
agreement dated April 17, 1979.2 Donegal acquired the Zambian debt from
Romania in 1999.3 Although the face value of the debt was close to thirty
million U.S. dollars in principal amount, Donegal acquired the debt at some
eleven percent of face value, or approximately $3.2 million U.S. 4
Donegal's attempt to collect the full face value with twelve percent
interest occurred during a time that global multilateral institutions and
developed world governments were engaged in significant amounts of debt
reduction for poor countries. The composition of debt of many developing
countries is potentially complex and varied, and ma r include debt from
private, government, and multilateral agency creditors. Further, some debt
incurred by developing countries, particularly from official lenders, may
effectively be commercial only in form, but more akin to a grant in
substance.6
A number of countries, including Zambia, have received significant
amounts of debt reduction from various creditors.7 The Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which began in 1996, has involved
billions of U.S. dollars in debt relief for a number of countries, including
Zambia.8  In 2005, for example, the International Monetary Fund
determined that Zambia was eligible for $2.5 billion in debt relief,9 which
represented a 62.6% reduction in Zambia's public debt. 10 Zambia has also
1 Donegal Int'l Ltd. v. Zambia & Anor, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 197, [2007] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 397, available at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC
/Comm/2007/197.html [hereinafter Donegal Decision 1].
2 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, paras. 1-6.
3 Id. para. 6.
4 Id. paras. 79, 200.
5 Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 82, 90-100 (2007)
(noting that recent cases involving odious debt have involved in large part other
governments and public institutions rather than foreign private creditors).
6 Id. at 83 (noting that official debt given by government to developing countries is likely
commercial in form only and given as loans due to domestic political opposition to outright
grants or a desire to reinforce a long-term political relationship).
7 See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
8 THE WORLD BANK, DEBT RELIEF FOR THE POOREST: AN EVALUATION UPDATE OF THE
HIPC INITIATIVE vii (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources
/ieghipcupdateevaluation2006.pdf (noting HIPC aggregate debt reduction). See also Daniel
Cohen, The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises, 4 INT'L FIN. 363, 363 (2001) (noting
that cancellation of poor countries' debt has been high on the policy agenda); Donegal
Decision I, supra note 1, para. 331 (noting twelve percent interest rate sought in Donegal
proceedings against Zambia in the British Virgin Islands).
9 Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Zambia: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries-Completion Point Document, at 3, IMF Country Report No. 05/137 (Apr. 2005).
'0 Id. at 7.
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negotiated debt reduction arrangements for debt incurred as a result of loans
from other governments. Since 1983, Zambia has negotiated debt reduction
arrangements with the Paris Club, an informal group of largely developed
world creditor governments. 11 Attempts by private creditors to enforce and
collect developing country debts are thought by many to compromise the
potential effectiveness of governmental and multilateral debt reduction
initiatives more generally. 12
Donegal purchased Zambia's debt from Romania at the same time that
Zambia itself was attempting to repurchase the debt. 13  Donegal later
entered into a Settlement Agreement with Zambia concerning the debt
Donegal purchased from Romania. 14 In the U.K. case, 15 Zambia asserted
that Donegal's purchase of the debt from Romania involved questionable
practices. Further, Zambia argued that the Settlement Agreement was
"tainted with illegality and corruption."' 6 Although the judge did not fully
accept Zambia's theories in this regard, he noted on multiple occasions that
he did not find the testimony of Donegal and its agents credible:
I regard the evidence in Mr Sheehan's witness statement... as so
incomplete as to be deliberately misleading ....
... I am driven to conclude that he [Mr Sheehan] was misleading in
his evidence at the American hearing....
... I have found that the complaint that Donegal provided the
[British Virgin Islands] court with incomplete and misleading
I Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, paras. 39-47; Press Release, Paris Club, Paris Club
Reduces Zambia's Debt Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (May 11, 2005), available at
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/communiques/zambie/switchLanguage/en
(noting the Paris Club's reduction of Zambian debt under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative).
12 See Time to Tame the Vultures, JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, Jan. 2009,
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=2893 (follow "Time to tame the vultures,
January 2009 briefing" hyperlink); see also David Bosco, The Debt Frenzy, 161 FOREIGN
POL'Y 36 (July-Aug. 2007).
13 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, paras. 65-72.
14 Id. paras. 1, 6-23.
15 Court hearings related to the Donegal-Zambia suit were heard in both the BVI and the
United States. Id. paras. 11, 26 (noting that after signing of the Settlement Agreement,
Donegal brought, but did not formally serve, proceedings against Zambia in the BVI, and
that evidence was also given at a hearing before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in May 2005 "under a subpoena issued pursuant to a request for mutual legal
assistance made by Zambia to the United States, the request originating from the Zambian
Task Force on Corruption.").
16 Id. para. 21(i).
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information is justified in significant respects....
... I find Donegal's account of how the Government signed the
agreement inherently improbable. 
17
The court's statements and findings in the Donegal case reflect its
significant concerns about the behavior of Donegal and its agents in
transactions surrounding Donegal's acquisition of the Zambian debt from
Romania, as well as in Donegal's attempts to enforce the debt against
Zambia. The court also found that Donegal had improperly sought and
obtained Zambian confidential information related to the debt. 8 The court
struck some provisions of the Settlement Agreement and found clauses in
the Settlement Agreement to constitute penal provisions that were not
genuine pre-estimates of loss, thus rendering such provisions
unenforceable.' 9 Further, at least in part as a consequence of Donegal's
business practices, the court discharged freezing orders that Donegal had
previously obtained, but permitted Donegal to present arguments about
granting new freezing relief.20 In a later decision in this case, the judge
reduced Donegal's fifty-five million dollar claim by forty million dollars,
awarding Donegal a judgment of just over fifteen million dollars plus
interest. ' The judge also reduced Donegal's costs by one-third due to the
dishonest evidence presented to the court by Donegal witnesses and
reinstated narrower freezing relief.22
Although the Donegal court explicitly limited its scrutiny to the legal
questions raised by the case rather than questions of morality and
humanity, 23 the moral and ethical considerations connected with the
activities of vulture investors are significant. This is particularly true in
Africa, which in the post-colonial period has experienced poor economic
performance in both absolute and relative terms, as well as significant and
even increasing levels of poverty.24 Poverty has exacerbated political
17 Id. paras. 167, 186, 344, 409.
18 Id. paras. 282-83.
19 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, para. 509 ("I therefore come to the argument that
clauses 2.3(d) and (e) are penal. A sum payable on breach is not a penalty if it is a genuine pre-
estimate of the loss that the innocent party is likely to suffer as a result of the breach.").
20 Id. paras. 544-47.
21 Donegal Int'l Ltd. v. Zambia & Anor, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 1016, [6] (2007).
22 Id. para. 21.
23 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, para. 2.
24 Elsa V. Artadi & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, The Economic Tragedy of the XXth Century:
Growth in Africa 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9865, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9865.
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instability in Africa.2 5 The political situation in much of the African
continent is similarly tenuous, with sub-Saharan African states in many
instances serving as exemplars of weak or failed states: "Black Africa's
forty-odd states are among the weakest in the world. State institutions and
organizations are less developed in the sub-Saharan region than almost
anywhere else."' 26  This African institutional, political, and economic
context has bearing on the operation of so-called "vulture funds, which are
typically private equity or hedge funds that seek to profit by repurchasing
debt at a discount and then collecting from the debtor country at face value
or an even higher amount. Vulture funds are not a new phenomenon.27
Although some assert that vulture funds serve an important market function
by creating a liquid secondary market for developing country debt, the
operation of vulture funds reflects an arbitrage of not only prices, but also
legal, institutional, and political structures.28  Further, the activities of
vulture funds may in fact serve to exacerbate the weaknesses of African
legal, institutional, and political structures. At a minimum, the extent to
which commercial activities of vulture funds and other commercial actors
contribute to or exacerbate economic and political instability should be
better understood.
B. Private Equity in International Perspective
The international activities of vulture funds reflect the greater global
reach of private equity funds, which a 2007 McKinsey & Co. report
Today, per capita GDP for Sub-Saharan Africa is 200 dollars smaller than it was in
1974, a decline of nearly 11% over a quarter of a century. This evolution is
especially worrisome if we consider that Africa was already extremely poor in
1974.... The African growth performance is dismal in absolute terms, but it is
worse if we take into account that, during this same period, the rest of the world
has been growing at an annual rate of close to 2%.
Id.
25 SUSAN E. RICE & STEWART PATRICK, INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD 4, 13 (2008), http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008
/02_weak-statesindex/02_weak statesindex.pdf (noting that poorer states are often
weaker ones and that "[flailed and critically weak states are geographically concentrated in
sub-Saharan Africa ... ").
26 Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POL. 1,1 (1982).
27 Jay Krasoff & John O'Neill, The Role of Distressed Investing and Hedge Funds in
Turnarounds and Buyouts and How This Affects Middle-Market Companies, 9 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 17, 17 (2006) (noting the long history of distressed investing).
28 See Bosco, supra note 12 (noting vulture funds focusing on poor and frequently
corrupt countries).
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characterizes as a new global financial market power broker.29 In the late
1990s, private equity constituted the fastest growing segment of corporate
finance markets. 0 In the mid-2000s, investments in the private equity
arena totaled $832 billion, which at the time was equal to the nominal gross
domestic product (GDP) of Mexico or India and forty times larger than the
GDP of Kenya. 31 Activities of private equity funds are typically subject to
little regulatory or other oversight, even in their home jurisdictions. Private
investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds are
generally structured to avoid securities and other regulatory and reporting
requirements.32 Private equity funds may also be formed in offshore
jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the Cayman Islands,
and the Channel Islands. Although subject to potentially varied
definitions, the term private equity is generally used to refer to private
investment funds that are not classified as hedge funds and may include
three primary types of funds: venture capital funds, leveraged buyout funds,
29 McKINSEY & COMPANY, THE NEW POWER BROKERS: How OIL, ASIA, HEDGE FUNDS
AND PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 19 (2007) (discussing hedge
funds and private equity as two new power brokers in global financial markets).
30 Stephen D. Prowse, The Economics of the Private Equity Market, EcON. REV. (FED.
RES. BANK OF DALLAS) 21, 21 (3d Q. 1998), http://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedder
/yl 998iqiiip21-34.html ("Over the past fifteen years, it has been the fastest growing market
for corporate finance, far surpassing others such as the public equity and bond markets and
the market for private placement debt.").
31 Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. Wadecki, The Private Equity Process, in PRIVATE
EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 3, 3 (Harry Cendrowski et al. eds., 2008).
32 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE EQUITY: RECENT GROWTH IN LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS EXPOSED RISKS THAT WARRANT CONTINUED ATTENTION 38 (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08885.pdf.
Private equity funds typically are organized as limited partnerships and structured
and operated in a manner that enables the funds and their advisers (private equity
firms) to qualify for exemptions from some of the federal statutory restrictions and
most SEC regulations that apply to registered investment pools, such as mutual
funds.
Id. 33 Nick Stevens & Heather MacCallum, Image Counts for Offshore Private Equity
Industry, PRIVATE EQUITY WIRE SPECIAL REPORT: JERSEY PRIVATE EQUITY SERVICES 2007,
http://www.privateequitywire.co.uk/articles/detail.jspcontentid=238538&livehome=true
(discussing private equity funds in Jersey); Sophia Harris, Cayman Islands: Is It an Offshore
Sham? A Balanced Perspective is Welcomed, MONDAQ, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article id=72754&lk=l; Craig M. Boise & Andrew P.
Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore Financial Intermediation:
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles 35-36 (U. Ill. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. LE08-
020, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=875026 (discussing hedge fund offshore
jurisdictions).
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and other types of funds.34
Private equity as an asset class has grown significantly due to
increasing investor demand for "alternative" asset classes that generate high
returns. 3  Private equity funds are often structured as limited partnerships
in which investors participate as limited partners (LPs), while the persons
managing the private equity fund are generally principals in the limited
liability' entity that serves as the private equity fund's general partner
(GP).3 LPs in private equity funds are usually institutional investors such
as private and public pension funds, banks, and insurance companies, or
high-net-worth individuals.37 The operation of private equity funds tends to
be "shrouded in secrecy. 38  As a result, private equity funds lack
transparency, which some see as contributing to potential market risk.39 In
the typical private equity fund, LPs make a pledge to contribute a certain
amount of capital to the fund (a "capital commitment") but do not typically
contribute the full amount at the time they make this commitment.
Investors are then required to make capital contributions to the fund
whenever the GP issues a capital call, an explicit request for funds, upon
receipt of which an LP is required to forward the requested pledged funds.4 °
Most private equity funds call one hundred percent of committed capital
within their first three or four years.4 1
General partners of private equity funds typically receive significant
compensation for their management and investment activities. In addition
to receiving standard management fees ranging from 1.25 to 3% per annum
based on capital commitments to the fund made by its LPs, GPs also
receive a share of fund profits, called the carried interest or carry, that
typically ranges between fifteen and twenty five percent.42  This
compensation structure has generally led to private equity professionals
being highly compensated, with total compensation of private equit
professionals increasing by twenty-seven percent between 2006 and 2007. 4
34 McKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 29, at 131.
" id. at 138.
36 Cendrowski & Wadecki, supra note 31, at 5, 6.
" Id. at 5.
31 Id. at 3-4.
39 McKiNSEY & COMPANY, supra note 29, at 128 (noting that private equity (LBO) may
amplify market risk).
40 Cendrowski & Wadecki, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that LPs must adhere to GP capital
calls).
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 7-8.
43 Jennifer Rossa, Compensation Soars, but PE Execs Keep Close Tabs on Their Wallets,
PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST, Sept. 1, 2008, available at https://www.fis.dowjones.com
/article.aspx?aid=DJFPEA0020080829e49 1 0000q&r=wsjblog&s=djfpea&ProductIDFromA
pplication=22 (noting that total equity compensation of private equity professionals,
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The growth of private equity has contributed to the privatization of
significant segments of economic activity.44 As private equity has grown in
scale and geographic reach, significant questions have been raised, even in
developed country capital markets, concerning the potential impact of
private equity funds on employment, corporations, and the broader
economy. The increasing scrutiny of private equity funds in developed
country financial markets reveals a lack of full understanding of the
activities of such funds in developed country capital markets. Not
surprisingly, the activities of such funds in emerging markets are even less
well understood. Private equity funds have increasingly identified
sovereign debt markets as a lucrative source of profits for fund managers
and their LPs. Such funds purchase the debt of countries that are "usually
poor and frequently corrupt, ' ' 46 which may actually exacerbate problems of
both poverty and corruption. Private creditors now hold an estimated one
billion dollars in judgments against "some of the world's poorest
countries. ' ' 47  Investors dealing in collection of sovereign debt include:
Greylock Global Opportunity, based in the BVI, which won a $50.9 million
judgment against Nicaragua; FG Hemisphere, based in the United States,
which won a $151.9 million judgment against Congo Republic and a $81.7
million judgment against the Democratic Republic of Congo; Kensington
International, based in the Cayman Islands, which won a $118.6 million
judgment against Congo Republic; and Grace Church Capital, based in the
Cayman Islands, which has sought a $39.7 million judgment against
Cameroon.48
The activities of Donegal in Zambia reflect many of the hallmarks of
private equity fund operations, particularly with respect to secrecy.
Donegal is a private equity fund that is part of a broader fabric of
nontransparent entities associated with Debt Advisory International LLC
including salary, bonus, and carried interest components, rose by 27.3% from $315,000 to
$401,000).
44 Joseph L. Rice, III, Letter on Behalf of the Advisory Board, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT V, v (World Economic Forum 2008),
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Full-Report.pdf.
45 Josh Lerner & Anuradha Gurung, Executive Summary, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT vii, vii (World Economic Forum 2008),
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Full-Report.pdf.
46 Bosco, supra note 12, at 38.
47 Id. See, e.g., Af-Cap v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006)
(involving appeal in "ongoing battle by Af-Cap, Inc. to receive payment from the Republic
of Congo on an outstanding debt.").
48 Funds in Sovereign Debt Business, PORTFOLIO.COM, July 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/intemational-news/portfolio/2008/06/16/Funds-in-
Sovereign-Debt-Business.
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(DAI), a Delaware LLC based in Washington, D.C. that was established
around 1995, and its owner, Mr. Michael Sheehan.49 DAI specializes in
debt counseling on emerging market corporate and sovereign debt. 0 DAI
incorporated Donegal in the BVI in December 1997.51 At the time Donegal
was being heard by the British High Court, Donegal was described as being
owned by Select Cap!ital Limited (Select Capital), an entity registered in the
BVI in June 1997. Select Capital specializes in acquiring distressed or
defaulted emerging market, sovereign, or corporate debt. 53 Although the
ultimate ownership of Select Capital is obscure,5 4 Select Capital "appears to
be an offshore vehicle for investors," the identities of whom are not
known.5 5 In a U.S. court hearing requested by the Zambian Task Force on
Corruption with respect to the Zambian-Donegal dispute, Sheehan
described Select Capital investors as "hedge fund investors and high net
worth individuals, principally in New York.",56 In Donegal's case in the
United Kingdom, Sheehan stated that Select Capital had three principal
shareholders and a "few individual shareholders with very small
positions. 57  Sheehan used DAI and another Delaware LLC called DS
Partners to manage the business of Select Capital.58 Donegal was originally
formed to acquire Zambian debt from Romania; this debt constituted
Donegal's only asset.
59
II. GOVERNANCE AND SCAVENGING: VULTURES AND HYENAS
IN AFRICA
A. African Institutional Frameworks: Sovereigns, Performance, and
Tyranny
The complexity and secrecy of Donegal's organizational and
operational structure and actual owners raise issues of significant concern in
49 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, paras. 24-28.
50 Id. para. 24.
51 Id. (noting that Sheehan, then a twenty percent owner, bought out other investors in
DAI in August 1998).
52 Id. para. 25.
53 Id. para. 26.
54 Id. para. 27.
55 Donegal Decision I, supra note 1, para. 27 ("The ultimate ownership of Select Capital
is rather obscure, but it appears to be an offshore vehicle for investors.").
56 id.
57 id.
58 Id. para. 25.
59 Id. paras. 25, 528 (noting that Donegal was incorporated as a special purpose vehicle
specifically to acquire the Zambian debt held by Romania, was acquired by Select Capital
due to its ownership of the Zambian debt, and had done no other significant business other
than with respect to the Zambian debt).
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the African context. The weakness of states in much of sub-Saharan Africa
and the lack of robust institutional frameworks form a poor foundation for
the types of transactions in which private equity funds might engage.6°
Assessing the operations of private equity funds that have been deemed
vultures in African contexts requires consideration of the role African
institutional structures may play in the creation of investment
"opportunities" for such funds. The manners, transparency, and integrity of
transactions that surround enforcement and collection of debt purchased by
vulture investors are also relevant factors that must be considered.
Continued poor performance of many African countries by most
measures of economic, political, and human welfare status draws attention
to significant inadequacies in African institutional frameworks.
61
Moreover, conditions in much of sub-Saharan Africa are evidence that
institutional frameworks that have thus far developed may in fact foster
inequality and other negative factors that underlie such conditions. 62 This
raises questions about not only institutions, but also broader concerns about
governance and the fundamental legal relationships that institutions and
policies are intended to promote. Governance in this context has been
defined as the "traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised., 63 As such, governance is a "broader, more inclusive" term than
government and "refers to the general manner in which a people is
governed... [and] can apply to the formal structures of government as well
as to the myriad institutions and groups which compose civil society in any
nation. ,
64
Sub-Saharan African countries generally have a poor record of both
60 John Mukum Mbaku, Entrenching Economic Freedom in Africa, 23 CATO J. 217, 221-
22 (2003) (noting lack of institutions that can guarantee long-term security of property rights
in Africa).
61 Id. at 221 (noting that the real problem in Africa is weak institutions and perverse
incentives, rather than a lack of resources, ignorance, or incompetence); Mancur Olson, Jr.,
Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why
Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 22 (1996) (asserting that
poor countries may not realize gains from specialization and trade due to a lack of impartial
institutions to enforce contracts).
62 Cf Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, History Lessons: Institutions,
Factors Endowments and Paths of Development in the New World, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 217,
224-28 (2000) (discussing how the path of institutional development affected relative growth
among New World economies).
63 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III:
Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, 18 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 253,
254 (2004) (noting that governance "includes the process by which governments are selected
and replaced, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, and
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.").
64 The Carter Center, Perestroika Without Glasnost in Africa, 2 CONF. REP. SERIES 1
(1989).
652
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governance and political, economic, and social performance as measured by
varied criteria.65 Poor economic performance in many African countries is
compounded by the fact that Africa's disastrous economic conditions may
actually benefit those in power:
As [] is the case for most [of] Africa, the lower part of the Nigerian
income distribution constantly shifts to the left reflecting the fact that
the incomes of the lowest 80% of the population deteriorate over
time. The shocking thing about this figure is that the upper part of
the distribution moves to the right. In other words, the richest
citizens of Nigeria actually benefit from the current disastrous
economic situation. From a political economy point of view, the
problem is these individuals whose incomes are improving are
probably the decision makers. 66
This income disparity underscores significant agency problems that
may exist in many African contexts. The fact that those in power may
benefit from disastrous economic, political, and social conditions indicates
a severe misalignment of incentives. Conditions in Africa during much of
the post-colonial era also reflect the rise of what has been characterized as
illiberal democracy, which in many instances entails having elections
without the liberal governance structures that have typically characterized
liberal democracy in the West. 67 As Amartya Sen has noted, successful
development in Africa, as elsewhere, requires "the removal of major
sources of unfreedoms: Poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public
facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.",6 o The
widespread presence of tyranny in Africa raises significant issues of consent
in contexts of commercial transactions that are far too often ignored. Such
issues of consent, however, are of critical importance because commercial
relationships have helped determine patterns of relationships within many
African countries as well as the terms and conditions of relationships
between African countries and the rest of the world.
The statist development model adopted by most African countries in
the post-colonial era has generally led to extensive government control of
African economies. 69 The African statist model has given African states
significant power to control resources, resource allocation, and private
65 Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, supra note 24, at 5.
66 Id.
67 Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 28 (Nov/Dec
1997) (noting the wave of recent democratization in Africa without the basic tenants of
liberal governance).
68 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999).
69 Mbaku, supra note 60, at 218.
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exchange. 70 This model has thus led to significant state dominance of the
economy in most African countries. 71 The dominance of the public sector
in many African countries has magnified the effects of the lack of alignment
of incentives, particularly since political office and control of the state have
been an important means of access to wealth in many African countries.
72
This misalignment of incentives facilitates scavenging behaviors and
contributes to the continuing fragility and vulnerability of African
institutional structures. As a result, many sub-Saharan African countries
have encountered difficulty in creating sustainable institutions that are
properly governed. Further, scavenging behaviors by internal hyenas have
created conditions and transactional circumstances that have drawn the
attention of vulture funds.
The nature and forms of legal and business transactions undertaken by
both hyenas and vultures give evidence that existing legal institutions do
not operate as they ideally might: to help instill good governance and align
incentives so that those who govern do so for the benefit of the broader
society. Looking at historical experience in other regions of the world may
shed light on what institutions worked in those particular contexts.
However, understanding the importance of institutions in other contexts
does not necessarily clarify how to translate such institutional frameworks
into African contexts or the nature of the relationships that need to exist
accordingly. Such prior models, may, however, provide information about




72 Id. at 219 (noting that African statism has enhanced "the ability of politicians and civil
servants to turn governance structures into instruments of plunder to enrich themselves at the
expense of society."); RAYMOND W. BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY
AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM 51-52 (2005) (noting the apparent
disappearance or theft of significant sums of money during varied governments in different
African countries, including $12.4 billion in Nigeria from 1990-1991, two to five billion
dollars in Nigeria from 1993-1998, seven billion dollars in the Ivory Coast, $4.2 billion in
Angola, and millions of dollars in Kenya and Gabon); MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF
AFRICA: A HISTORY OF FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 220 (2005) (noting that access to the
government spending process became the gateway to fortune in Nigeria, where patronage
politics and corruption reached new heights); ECON. COMM. AFR., PUBLIC SECTOR
MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN AFRICA 1 (2004), available at http://www.uneca.org
/ecaresources/Publications/dpmd/public sectormangt.pdf ("[G]overnance in Africa has
been marked by authoritarianism and state privatization for the benefit of the ruling elite,
resulting in institutional disintegration rather than development.").
73 Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History and Economic Development 1 (U. Chi. L. &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 271, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875026.
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B. The Slave Trade, the Colonial State, and African Institutions
Institutional structures in Africa have been significantly affected by
historical experience, particularly related to the slave trade and colonialism,
both of which helped give shape to distinctive conditions in Africa that
have remained influential long after the end of colonialism. Much has been
written concerning the post-colonial African economic, political, and social
conditions. Although decolonization brought independence to former
colonies, "it did not, as a rule, change the underlying social and economic
structures of their societies. '' 74  Consequently, although authoritarian in
nature,75 the colonial state, as a legally constituted and administered state,
became a basis for post-independence legal structures.7 6 Colonial rule,
however, did not offer a good preparation for the emergence of post-
independence democratic states: 77 colonial governments focused on having
minimal colonial administration and sought to make colonial territories self-
governing. 78 As a result, education was typically handled by Christian
missionaries and economic activities by commercial companies. 79  The
colonial powers saw little need for rapid development: "In much of Africa,
therefore, the colonial imprint was barely noticeable .... In northern
Nigeria, Frederick Lugard set out to rule 10 million people with a staff of
nine European administrators and a regiment.., consisting of 3,000
African troops under the command of European officers." 80
Current conditions in many African countries are at least in part a
consequence of circumstances and laws that were created during and prior
to the colonial era. 8 1 In the political sphere, for example, "Africa inherited
liberal democracy.., from the accelerated and panicky process of rapid
decolonization. It was only in the last decade of colonialism, when
independence became a certainty, that the imperialist powers gradually
74 Yash Ghai, The Role of Law in the Transition of Societies: The African Experience, 35
J. AFR. L. 8, 8 (1991).
75 Id.; James S. Read, Studies in the Making of Colonial Laws: An Introduction, 23 J.
AFR. L. 1, 6 (1979) (noting that colonial subjects were scarcely consulted at all in the process
of colonial law-making).
76 Ghai, supra note 74, at 8 (noting that despite its authoritarianism, the colonial state
"was a legally constituted and administered state.").
77 Barry Munslow, Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?, 36
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 218, 224 (1983) ("Colonial rule was by no means a preparation for
post-independence democratic government. It was extremely hierarchical, at best paternalist
and at worst authoritarian.").
78 MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 5.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Joanna Stevens, Colonial Relics I: The Requirement of a Permit to Hold a
Peaceful Assembly, 41 J. AFR. L. 118, 132 (1997) (discussing contemporary legal treatment
of questionable laws of colonial or other origin).
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began to institute democratic reforms in what had hitherto been structures
of exploitation, despotism, and degradation. 8 2
Not surprisingly, such imperialist models of democracy disintegrated
rapidly.8 3 What was left following such disintegration was characterized by
few successes that were often "precarious, temporary, and crippled by...
class and ethnic limitations. 8 4 The failures were "egregious, massive, and
tragic" and any remaining civil liberties "fragile, vulnerable, and under
constant threat of death." This fragile and precarious state reflects the
extent to which institutional structures designed to support liberal
democracy and customized to fit the African political and economic reality
did not emerge in Africa in the post-colonial era.8 6 This is often interpreted
as a matter of failed institutions and institutional framework and the fault is
often attributed to Africans and interpreted as failures in competence and
capacity.7 However, the factors underlying many failed African political
and economic models are quite complex and rooted in the unique historical
experiences of African countries not only with respect to colonialism, 88 but
also in relation to the slave trade and pre-colonial institutions.8 9  These
circumstances have contributed to elements of tyranny in many African
countries.
Recent empirical studies suggest that state legitimacy in African
countries today is in part dependent on the congruence between pre-colonial
and post-colonial political structures. 90 This congruence was significantly
82 Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. Sci. Q. 455, 457 (1990)
(discussing the emergence of modem authoritarianism in Africa).
83 Id. at 458.
84 Id. at 459.
85 Id.
86 See generally Fatton, supra note 82.
87 Munslow, supra note 77, at 219 ("When failures took place like a collapsing house of
cards, reasons were sought in the Africans' unpreparedness for democracy, with a reversion
to the traditional systems.").
88 See James Robinson, States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey Herbst: A Review Essay, 40
J. EcoN. LIT. 510, 512 (2002) ("Africa is different because the structural conditions that led
to the path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent in Africa.").
89 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, Reversal of Fortune:
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.
J. EcON. 1231, 1279 (2002) (noting that European colonization led to institutional reversal
and a reversal in relative incomes among countries that were relatively rich in 1500 that are
now relatively poor); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Colonial
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 1369,
1370 (2001) (using settler mortality rates to demonstrate that colonies with higher European
mortality rates are today substantially poorer than colonies that were more healthful for
Europeans, suggesting that in colonies where Europeans settled, colonial powers established
different institutional frameworks as contrasted at the other extreme with "extractive"
institutional models exemplified in the Belgian Congo).
90 See, e.g., Pierre Englebert, Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and
656
Vultures, Hyenas, and African Debt
29:643 (2009)
influenced by the slave trade, which led to significant political
fragmentation in large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa prior to the formal
creation of African colonies at the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885.91
The Conference of Berlin has been described as "the biggest Monopoly
game in history." 92 The divisions made at the Conference of Berlin were
based on inaccurate, little, or no information:
The maps used to carve up the African continent were mostly
inaccurate; large areas were described as terra incognita. When
marking out the boundaries of their new territories, European
negotiators frequently resorted to drawing straight lines on the map,
taking little or no account of the myriad traditional monarchies,
chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground.
Nearly one half of the new frontiers imposed on Africa were
geometric lines, lines of latitude and longitude, other straight lines or
arcs of circles .... In all, the new boundaries cut through some 190
culture groups. In other cases, Europe's new colonial territories
enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no
common history, culture, language or religion. Nigeria ... contained
as many as 250 ethnolinguistic groups. Officials sent to the Belgian
Congo eventually identified six thousand chiefdoms there ....
Kingdoms that had been historically antagonistic to one another,
such as Buganda and Bunyoro in Uganda, were linked into the same
colony. 9
The consequences of such methods of division and the colonial
policies that followed were profoundly important for present conditions and
the development of institutions in sub-Saharan Africa: "Because, of all
Economic Development in Tropical Africa, 53 POL. RES. Q. 7, 14 (2000) (noting that
congruence between pre-colonial and post-colonial political structures is an important
determinant of state legitimacy in Africa today).
91 RUTH WATSON, 'CIVIL DISORDER IS THE DISEASE OF IBADAN': CHIEFTAINCY AND CIVIC
CULTURE IN A YORUBA CITY 4 (2003) (noting the disruption and political turmoil in
contemporary southwestern Nigeria from the 1820s onward, connected to the combination of
the collapse of the Oyo Empire, the expansion of the Sokoto Caliphate and the prohibition
and disruption of the Atlantic slave trade); A.G. Hopkins, Economic Imperialism in West
Africa: Lagos, 1880-92, 21 ECON. HIST. REV. 580, 586-87 (1968) (noting that the slave
trade led to civil disorder and inter-state warfare and encouraged the rise of a warrior class
that exerted significant influence over the policies of Yoruba states, including Ibadan, which
was formed as a war camp); Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa 's Slave Trades,
123 Q. J. ECON. 139, 142 (2008) (noting that unlike previous slave trading, the African slave
trades had "particularly detrimental consequences, including social and ethnic fragmentation,
political instability and a weakening of states, and the corruption of judicial institutions.").
92 NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: How BRITAIN MADE THE MODERN WORLD 235 (2003)
(noting that "[t]he biggest game of Monopoly in history was about to begin. Africa was the
board.").
93 MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 1-2.
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regions, sub-Saharan Africa has the largest concentration of arbitrary
postcolonial states, with little or no embeddedness into precolonial
institutions and preexisting norms of political authority, its economic
performance tends to be weaker even after controlling for other variables
known to differ between Africa and other regions. 94 The colonial power
under which a country was formed may also have had an influence on post-
colonial economic performance.
95
The current performance of African countries is closely related to
questions of political fragmentation and legitimacy that relate in turn to the
African experience with the slave trade and colonialism.96 Further, states
with greater legitimacy among developing countries have significantly
better economic performance and have grown at five times the rate of states
with less legitimacy. 97  Legitimacy plays an important role in the
development of the effective institutional frameworks that were so
important in the economic development of Europe, for example. 98
The lack of legitimacy of many African states has manifest
consequences in Africa today and is reflected in patronialism, for
example.99 In the political realm, the trend toward authoritarian rule in
post-independence Africa has been extensively discussed. 0° In the first
two decades of independence, forty successful coups occurred in Africa
with countless attempted coups.'01 The political situation in much of Africa
is closely related to Africa's continuing economic troubles. 10 2  From an
94 Pierre Englebert, Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy, 28 WORLD DEV. 1821,
1822 (2000).
95 Robin Grier, Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth, 98 PUBLIC CHOICE 317, 326-
28 (1999) (noting that former French colonies in Africa have poorer economic performance
and finding that duration of colonization and British identity of the colonial power are
positively correlated with education indicating that the British left a more educated
population in Africa after colonialism).
96 Nunn, supra note 91, at 140 (finding a "robust negative relationship between the
number of slaves exported from each country and subsequent economic performance").
97 Englebert, supra note 94, at 1828-29.
98 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 547, 550, 561-62
(2005) (noting that the post- 1500 economic development of Europe was facilitated by the
indirect institutional consequences of the Atlantic trade, which included the development of
political institutions that limited and constrained state power, as well as direct profits from
the colonialism and slavery associated with this trade).
99 Fatton, supra note 82, at 459.
100 Id. at 456.
101 MEREDITH, supra note 72, at 218.
102 Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, 41
WORLD POL. 407, 409 (1989) (noting that political and economic crises in Africa are
interrelated and that a "self-perpetuating cycle of change" exists in which "weak states
engender anemic economies whose poor performance in turn further undermines the
capacity of the state apparatus").
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economic perspective, Africa has been characterized by continuing
economic crises and an increasing gap in economic performance with the
rest of the world.
10 3
On a broader social level, current conditions in many African countries
reflect the negative consequences of centuries of slave trading, which had a
tremendous negative impact on African institutional development. 104 The
slave trade had significant legal implications as well, particularly since legal
systems began to be used to enslave people: "Judicial penalties that
formerly had taken the form of beatings, payment of compensation or exile,
for example, were now converted to enslavement. The slave trade became a
way of getting rid of enemies and unwanted people.' '0 5 The slave trade
may have also contributed to a general lack of trust in Africa, 106 which may
have had significant continuing implications for the economic development
and the establishment of business and legal relationships based on trust
within and among African countries.
The existence of the slave trade and colonialism in Africa has led to
institutional structures that are distinctive as compared with the structures
that accompanied European economic development. For example, the
distinction between the public and private is one of fundamental importance
in the economic, political, and social development of Europe.10 7 Although
certainly not always clear-cut and definitive in shape, the distinction
between public and private is a fundamental one shaped by the historical
experience of many countries in the West. 10 8 In many countries in Africa,
distinctions between the state realm and "civil society" are "far from
103 John Ravenhill, Africa's Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development, in
AFRICA IN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1, 2 (John Ravenhill ed., 1986) (noting that per capita incomes
might fall below levels at the time of independence and that the welfare gap between Africa
and the rest of the world has widened).
104 Nunn, supra note 91, at 141 ("My results show that not only was the use of slaves
detrimental for a society, but the production of slaves, which occurred through domestic
warfare, raiding, and kidnapping, also had negative impacts on subsequent development.").
105 Martin A. Klein, The Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies, 42 J. AFR. HIST. 49, 59
(2001); Walter Hawthorne, The Production of Slaves Where There Was No State: The
Guinea-Bissau Region, 1450-1815, 20 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 97, 119 (1999) (noting that
decentralized and stateless coastal groups produced slaves in a number of ways, including by
"refashioning the judicial institutions that structured intra-group relations").
106 See Nathan Nunn & Leonard Wantchekon, The Slave Trade and the Origins of
Mistrust in Africa (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu
/faculty/nunn/files/Trust.v6.pdf (establishing in an empirical study that the slave trade had a
negative influence on trust, which had significant long-term implications for economic
development in Africa).
107 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 11, 43-51 (1962) (discussing the modem
separation between the private and public spheres in Europe in which the "public" became a
contrast to everything "private").
108 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:643 (2009)
clear."' 09 In addition, although African states are typically weak, the public
sector has been quite large in many African countries as compared with
Western countries. 1 0 The relative dominance and concentration of the
public sector in Africa magnifies the consequences of corruption."' The
magnitude of the public sector in Africa is also a negative factor in
economic growth. 1
C. African Sovereigns and Commerce: Business History, Models, and
Current Conditions
African institutional structures reflect historical forces with continued
resonance today and serve as a backdrop for contemporary commercial
relationships. The benefits and proceeds of such relationships may in many
instances provide fuel that furthers tyranny and other elements of
oppression. Considering the broader implications of commercial and
business transactions is important in both absolute and relative terms,
particularly given the globalized and increasingly privatized business
environment in which many countries and businesses may now operate.
Looking at African conditions from the perspective of business history
can be quite illuminating for two reasons. First, the development of
corporate forms was important in the development of political and
economic institutions in Europe. 1 3  These corporate forms provided a
broader institutional framework for the operation of commercial actors in a
broad range of arenas, including limited liability entities such as private
equity funds. The corporate forms that existed prior to the nineteenth
century were distinct from current corporate forms in important ways,
1 14
109 Ernest Harsch, Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa,
31 J. MOD. AFR. STUDIES 31, 34 (1993). See also John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic
Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups, 16 CATO J. 99 (1996), available at
http://www.cato.org /pubs/journal/cj 16nl/cj 16nl -6.pdf.
110 Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience, 88
POL. Sci. Q. 71, 77 (1973) (noting that "by the end of 1964, nearly 70% of Ghanaian wage
earners were public employees, who were responsible for nearly all of the significant sectors
of the economy and for 27% of manufacturing output").
Id.
112 Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that more public spending is bad
for economic growth and that if Africa had had levels of public spending similar to the
OECD over the last forty years, annual growth rates would have been 0.40% points larger).
113 See FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE: CIVILIZATION & CAPITALISM-
15TH TO 18TH CENTURY v. 2, at 434-46 (1982) (discussing the evolution of trading
merchants from maritime firms to large trading companies that became dominant in
European international trade by the eighteenth century); Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson,
supra note 98, at 561-62 (discussing the importance of the Atlantic trade in the development
of European political and economic institutions).
114 Abbott Payson Usher, Monopoly in the Colonial Trade and in the Expansion of
Europe Subsequent to 1800, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 56-57 (1948) (discussing the varieties
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including with respect to questions of company monopolies and the role of
states in such enterprises. 115 Despite these differences, the merchant trading
entities that developed between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in
Europe are in some respects precursors to the modem multinational
corporation.'1 6  Such entities also played an important role in the
delineation of the public and private sectors in Europe, particularly in
connection with the determination of the proper role of the state in
economic activities. 117
Further, the history of the great European trading companies such as
the Dutch East India Company involved the determination of a trading zone
to be exploited, which had significant implications for the regions of the
world in which such trading companies operated. 118 This underscores the
fact that European imperialism and colonialism included significant
commercial aspects, which typically focused on extractive activities.11 9 In
addition to chartered trading companies, smaller merchant firms played an
important role in Africa. The picture of the operation of such enterprises in
of charters granted by European states to companies that operated in Africa such as the
Royal Niger Company (chartered in 1886) and the British South Africa Company (chartered
in 1889)).
115 BRAUDEL, supra note 113, at 443-44 (noting that the great trading companies were
borne of trade monopolies and included state involvement).
116 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 5-27 (2004) (connecting the modem corporation and the great European trading
companies such as the Dutch East India Company); GEOFFREY JONES, MERCHANTS TO
MULTINATIONALS: BRITISH TRADING COMPANIES IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (2000) (noting the emergence in Britain of complex multinational business
groups that controlled large investments in natural resources, processing, and services in
Asia, Latin America, and Africa); K.N. Chaudhuri, Treasure and Trade Balances: The East
India Company's Export Trade, 1660-1720, 21 ECON. HIST. REv. 480, 480 (1968) (noting
that in the late seventeenth century the English East India Company was just beginning to
exercise significant influence over English business life as centered in the City of London).
117 Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J. L. ECON & ORG. 141, 142
(1988) (noting the debate between mercantilists and free traders about the role of the
government in the economy in Europe during the eighteenth century).
118 BRAUDEL, supra note 113, at 444.
119 A.G. Hopkins, Imperial Business in Africa, Part I: Sources, 17 J. AFR. HIST. 29, 29
(1976) (acknowledging the importance of expatriate trading firms in the business history of
Africa, but noting that sources of information with respect to the activities of such firms
remain scarce and understudied); A.G. Hopkins, Imperial Business in Africa, Part II:
Interpretations, 17 J. AFR. HIST. 267, 280 (1976) [hereinafter Hopkins II] (noting that the
nineteenth century was "made for freebooters and frontiersmen who excelled at a type of
slash and burn or 'swidden' commerce" in which windfall gains generated by extractive
activities were not atypical); Hopkins, supra note 91, at 583 (noting that the commercial link
had been dominant in relations between Africa and Europe since the beginning of the slave
trade in the fifteenth century); W.M. Mathew, The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru 1820-
70, 21 ECON. HIST. REv. 562, 565 (1968) (noting the ways in which British political and
commercial interests were intermixed in its relationship with countries such as Peru).
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Africa is understudied and at times reflects conflicts between business firms
and European colonial administrators.' However, the operation of such
business interests in Africa in some instances can be tied directly to
economic and political weaknesses that exist today. For example,
understanding the operation of chartered companies during Portuguese rule
is essential for understanding economic weaknesses that exist in
Mozambique today. 121
Informal imperialism rooted in business activities played a significant
role in the operation of European states and firms in Africa and elsewhere
in the world. 122 Understanding the structure of relationships that developed
through the activities of such actors in Africa prior to independence is
important for understanding the nature of the incentives that may still be
operative in Africa. The operation of European firms and states in Africa
were based on structural models that in many respects are an important
element in the structural and institutional problems that have been so
prevalent in Africa in the post-colonial era. The trading relationships
between Africa and Europe were typically driven by European demands. 123
Further, the firms that operated in Africa did not operate for the benefit of
the colonized. 124 The firms that engaged in such trading were owned by
external stockholders and typically acted in the interests of such
stockholders. This was the case of the Mozambique Company, which was
chartered by the government of Portugal in part for economic development
purposes. Rather than reinvesting funds in Mozambique, the
Mozambique Company engaged in stock speculation and invested funds in
European banks to draw interest.12 6  In addition to starving the local
administration of funds, the Mozambique Company engaged in policies that
120 Hopkins II, supra note 119, at 272 (discussing occurrence of friction between the
Colonial Office and expatriate firms).
121 Leroy Vail, Mozambique's Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble, 17 J. AFR.
HIST. 389, 389 (1976).
122 FERGUSON, supra note 92, at 243-44 (referring to the "informal imperialism" involved
in the economic reach of British capital in Argentina and Brazil in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, despite the fact that these countries were not formally British
colonies or even in the sphere of the British imperial shadow).
123 Monday Efiong Noah, Inland Ports and European Trading Firms, 88 AFR. AFF. 25,
25-27 (1989) (discussing the transition in trade between West Africa and Europe from the
slave trade to trade in palm oil and other products that supplied the need for light and soap
with the advent of the European industrial age).
124 ONwuKA DIKE, TRADE AND POLITICS IN THE NIGER DELTA, 1830-1885: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA 1 (1956) (noting the
five centuries of trade between West Africa and Europe and the fact that such trade
fluctuated in accordance with European policies and demands).
125 Vail, supra note 121, at 395.
126 Id.
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inhibited local development, including forced labor. 
127
The operation of European states and firms in Africa raises significant
structural questions with respect to the incentives that were established
prior to colonialism. Many of these incentive structures have survived the
end of colonialism and formal rule of African countries by European states.
Consequently, failures in governance and institutions today also relate to
and are magnified by the patterns of relationships that were established
prior to independence. The operation of private equity funds in Africa, as
evident in the activities of Donegal, underscores some important
consequences of failed African institutional infrastructures.
III. VULTURE INVESTORS AND SECONDARY MARKETS FOR
AFRICAN SOVEREIGN DEBT
A. Vultures, Hyenas, and Odious Debts
Institutional models that have developed in many African contexts
raise persistent questions with respect to lack of consent. Potential
concerns are reinforced by webs of commercial relationships entered into
by sovereigns and ruling elites who may operate with few restrictions and
who may also receive a disproportionate share of the benefits of such
relationships. These commercial relationships involve transactions that deal
with debt, allocations of rights with respect to resources, purchase of
tangible goods and services, and a myriad of other types of commercial
transactions. Developing country debt transactions have received particular
attention because they led a number of countries to incur high and in some
instances unsustainable debt levels. Such developing country debts have
received increased scrutiny in recent years, particularly with regard to the
circumstances under which later governments might repudiate such debts.
Some refer to debts incurred by many developing countries as odious
debts. 128 Discussions in existing odious debt scholarship propose a broad
range of potential solutions to deal with inequitable transactions entered
into by tyrants or corrupt leaders, including changes in contract
interpretations, changing legal doctrines and interpretations, and limitations
in secondary markets for certain types of sovereign debt. 129 The extent to
127 Id. at 395-96.
128 See Joseph Hanlon, Dictators and Debt, JUBILEE REs., Nov. 1998,
http://www.jubileeresearch.org (search "Hanlon," then follow "Jubilee Research: Jubilee
2000: Report: Dictators debt" hyperlink).
129 Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious
Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007) (discussing remedies based in contract); Seema
Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 82 (2006) (discussing
repudiation of debt obligations based on theories related to benefit and consent); Ctr. for Int'l
Sustainable Dev. Law [CISDL], Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, CISDL Working
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which institutions and governance regimes within a country permit citizens
to exercise consent to ruling authority should be a critical factor in
determining whether and when debts may be repudiated. Identifying
applicable transactions in the African context requires clearer fundamental
principles governing delineation of the boundaries between transactions that
may or may not be repudiated.
As legal scholar Anna Gelpern has highlighted, debt of developing
countries given by official sources may be commercial in form but not in
substance. 30 Much other legal commentary on odious debt has discussed
remedies in the context of private creditors. 31 The Donegal case highlights
the importance of the form, regardless of the underlying substance of the
original loan transaction. By creating a secondary market in what was
originally government debt, Donegal was able to enforce a government-to-
government debt as a private creditor, which may have potential
implications for loans given by governments that are structured as loans in
form but that are not actually loans in substance. As the Donegal judge
notes, the effective transfer of the Romanian debt from a government
creditor to a private creditor has significant legal implications, particularly
with respect to commercial transactions and sovereign immunity. 132 To the
extent that secondary markets are created in debt given by government
creditors, distinctions between official creditors and private creditors may
be less pertinent. Further, differences between loan transactions in form as
compared with substance may become less important. Secondary markets
in developing country debt may also make attempts to identify and
distinguish treatment of debts identified as odious more difficult. 13
Donegal and other so-called vulture funds have been significantly
criticized on account of their activities in poor countries. Vulture funds
have been awarded significant sums in recent years.134  Such cases may
even involve third parties, as has been the case with a series of cases
Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, (Mar. 11, 2003) available at http://www.odiousdebts.org
/odiousdebts/publications/Advancing__theOdious_DebtDoctrine.pdf; Odious Debts,
http://www.odiousdebts.org (giving comprehensive overview of legal status and history of
odious debt doctrine).
130 Gelpern, supra note 5, at 90-100.
131 See supra note 129.
132 Donegal Decision 1, supra note 1, paras. 261, 302. See also Robert Was, The
Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of Contemporary
International Legalism, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 213, 213 (Craig Scott ed.,
2001), available at http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/0/6F3E8109135F324A852571B
80073C79A/$FILE/The%/20Commercial%/20Activity%/2OException.pdf.
133 CISDL, supra note 129, at 11 ("Any attempt to invoke the doctrine of odious debts is
seriously complicated by the emergence of debt restructuring agreements and secondary
markets for debt.").
134 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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involving the Republic of Congo, which has enmeshed several international
oil and gas companies as a result of vulture funds seeking to garnish royalty
payments contractually owed from such companies to the Republic of
Congo. 135 Some defend the activities of vulture funds by pointing out that
as a legal matter sovereigns generally do take on the obligations of their
predecessors.' 36 Those who oppose the activities of vulture funds suggest
that debts that constitute "odious" debts undertaken by corrupt
governments, for example, should be able to be repudiated by successor
governments.1 37 Odious debt doctrine has been described as a "doctrine of
public-international law aspiring to the status of customary international
law."' 138  Odious debt has been defined as debt "contracted against the
interests of the population of a state, without consent, and with the full
awareness of the creditor."' 39  Consideration of developing country debt
from varied perspectives would benefit from more explicit consideration of
the assumed nature of the sovereign and institutional context of the
sovereign's operation with respect to transactions that are commercial in
either substance or form.
Different readings of the Donegal-Zambia case may involve
fundamentally divergent assumptions about sovereign states and the
institutional contexts of the exercise of sovereign authority. The realities of
government and governance in many African contexts suggest that legal
interpretations of contracts by sovereign governments need to take better
account of the institutional contexts within which such contracts are
negotiated and put in force. Further, because sovereigns have been weak, if
not failing, and ruling elites often corrupt in many post-colonial African
contexts, 14 the post-colonial African condition has reflected varying
135 FG Hemisphere Assoc. v. Republique du Congo, 455 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2006);
Andrew Derman & William Katz, Vultures in Congo, ENERGY RISK 16-17 (Sept. 2006),
http://www.tklaw.com/resources/documents/Vultures%20in%20Congo-Derman,%2OKatz
%20&%20Melsheimerl .pdf.
136 Felix Salmon, In Defense of Vulture Funds, FELIXSALMON.COM BLOG, Feb. 24, 2007,
http://www.felixsalmon.com/000667.html.
137 Ashley Saegear, 'Vulture' Feeds on Zambia, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/feb/15/debt.development (describing the reactions
of Oxfam and Jubilee Debt Campaign to the February 2007 Donegal court decision); Larry
CatA Backer, Odious Debts and "Vulture Funds": Making a Case for Repudiation of
Sovereign Debt, LARRY CATA BACKER BLOG, Feb. 16, 2007,
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/02/odious-debt-and-vulture-funds-making.html.
138 Gelpem, supra note 5, at 85.
139 CISDL, supra note 129, at 13.
140 Harsch, supra note 109, at 31 ("[S]imilar expressions of public outrage against
corruption and corrupt officials have occurred in many an African country since the
beginning of the 1990s, given greater rein by the eruption of pro-democracy movements that
drew large numbers of people into political debate and organisation."); Mbaku, supra note
109.
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degrees of tyranny. 14 1 Tyranny has in turn contributed to the seemingly
endemic political and economic chaos that far too often characterizes
conditions in many African countries. Tyranny in many African countries
has facilitated scavenging by internal constituencies that echoes the
predatory extractive behaviors common during the colonial era, as well as
scavenging by external constituencies, at times in concert with internal
scavengers.
B. Vulture Investors and Markets for Change of Control: The Sovereign
Difference and Tyrant Debt
The magnitude of tyranny and scavenging in many African contexts
clearly distinguishes repurchases of African sovereign debt from the types
of distressed company transactions in which private equity firms have in the
past have more typically engaged. 142 Distressed debt secondary markets
were created in the United States,143 but form an increasingly important
segment of global private equity markets. 144 Both hedge funds and private
equity funds participate in distressed company investing. 14  One type of
distressed company transaction structure involves direct investment in a
distressed entity, often with a goal of control. 146  In such transactions,
investors typically identify distressed companies that are undervalued, and
invest in the stock or debt of such companies, usually at a discount, with the
goal of achieving high returns once the distressed company emerges from
bankruptcy or is reorganized. 147 Vulture fund activities are more closely
analogous to private equity distressed company trading activities without
the element of control. Distressed debt trading involves purchase of
discounted, undervalued, or mispriced loans, loan portfolios or traded
141 GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED 293-304 (1993) (discussing tyrannical
regimes in Africa).
142 Richard M. Bolton & William T. Burgess, Private Equity Fund and Portfolio
Company Investment, in PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 335,
346-56 (Harry Cendrowski et al. eds., 2008).
143 John Flood, The Vultures Fly East: The Creation and Globalisation of the Distressed
Debt Market, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 257, 268 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.,
2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractuid=949581&rec=l
&srcabs= 147643 (noting that distressed securities secondary markets were first established
in the United States).
144 Kelly DePonte, An Overview of the Private Equity Distressed Debt and Restructuring
Markets, in THE GUIDE TO DISTRESSED AND TURN-AROUND INVESTING 17, 17 (Prohibitas
Partners 2006), available at http://www.probitaspartners.com/pdfs/distressed-debtkd_
2006.pdf.
145 Jay Krasoff & John O'Neill, supra note 27 (discussing distressed investment
markets).
146 Id.; DePonte, supra note 144, at 17-18.
147 DePonte, supra note 144, at 17-18.
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securities, with resale of such assets at a later time for a profit. 148 In public
market contexts, distressed debt trading can serve the important market
function of facilitating identification of arbitrage opportunities in mispriced
securities and taking advantage of and profiting from this recognition,
resulting in more rational pricing of debt. 49 In such instances, secondary
markets may influence primary markets and create incentives for more
rational pricing in primary debt markets. 150  In this manner, secondary
market trading may improve and facilitate primary market activities and
encourage greater and more efficient lending. Vulture investors in
distressed company contexts also play an important role with respect to the
market for change of control. 15' The activities of vulture investors in
distressed company contexts may effectively discipline managers of
distressed firms by replacing them with new management or using control
and the threat of a potential replacement to solicit improved performance
from existing management. 
5 2
In contrast, the potentially positive efficiency effects of secondary
trading markets for distressed company debt do not necessarily extend to
secondary markets in debts incurred by developing country tyrants. First
and foremost, unlike the distressed company context, where company
control can be wrested in many instances from poor managers or to
148 Id. at 17; Beatty Barfield Page & Federico Arturo Goudie, The Distressed Loan
Trading Market in the United States, Presentation at the International Conference on
"Insolvency is Changing Globally-How and Why" (Apr. 17-20, 2004), available at
http://www.hugheshubbard.com/files/Publication/41 bf6cdf-eb57-48fa-8580-499abad24943
/Presentation/PublicationAttachmentad5b3 I cO-074b-462a-b9da-4c3466448f93/Distressed_
LoanApril_2004.pdf ("Investments in distressed debt in the United States involve both the
acquisition of publicly traded or privately held corporate bonds as well as the acquisition of
loans and loan portfolios.").
149 See Edward I. Altman, Distressed and Defaulted Debt Securities: Market Dynamics
and Investment Performance, 9 FIN. MARKETS & PORTFOLIO MGMT. 322 (1995) (describing
distressed securities investment strategies and noting that distressed security investors are
sometimes called vultures); Moe Ibrahim, An Overview of Distressed Debt, EUREKAHEDGE,
2006, http://www.theasiandebtfund.com/files/Finance Asia -0901.pdf ("Distressed debt
investors scour the market for undervalued debt securities . . . purchase the debt at deeply
discounted prices, and adopt various strategies to enhance the debt's value.").
150 Jeffery W. Gunther & Anna Zhang, Hedge Fund Investors More Rational Than Rash,
2 ECON. LETTER-FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 6, Aug. 2007, available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0708.html (noting that hedge funds, "[b]y
seeking arbitrage opportunities associated with misaligned prices and exploiting them
through short sales, derivatives and other leveraged trading strategies, hedge funds promote
price discovery, resulting in more efficient markets and lower capital costs.").
151 Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for
Control of Distressed Firms 5 (Working Paper, Mar. 1996), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1883 (noting that vulture investors
typically have an influence over the restructuring process for distressed companies).
152 Id. at 27 (finding in empirical study of vulture investors that "vulture investors serve
to discipline managers of companies in financial distress.").
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:643 (2009)
facilitate improved performance from existing managers, tyrants are often
difficult to dislodge. At least in part as a result of the lack of an effective
market for change of control in cases of loans to tyrants, secondary markets
in tyrant debt are not likely to have a positive impact from a control
perspective. In fact, tyrant debt transactions likely need the reverse effect in
that primary markets for such debt should be limited, particularly in the
African context where tyrants have been almost uniformly predatory and
ineffective. In many instances, African tyrants have also contributed to
greater poverty, violence, and political instability.153  Loans involving
tyrants have in many instances facilitated repression by giving tyrants funds
for purchases of weaponry intended for internal control purposes. 154 They
also contributed to the consolidation and furtherance of tyrant control by
providin§ funds that find their way to private accounts of tyrants and their
cronies.
Although defining what constitutes a debt that can be repudiated is not
always clear, future governments should not be accountable for the debts
incurred by tyrants due to a lack of consent that renders tyrants internally
unaccountable for their activities. 156 Requiring later governments to honor
such loan obligations effectively forces the population of the country to
bear the risk of loan transactions entered into by leaders over whom they
had little choice in selecting and little or no ability to dislodge. Some
discussions of sovereign debt incorporate implicit assumptions of sovereign
accountability that do not take adequate account of the essential
unaccountability of tyrants. To the extent that they are accountable to
anyone, such tyrants may, in many instances, only be accountable to
external parties, including those that lend to them. In loan contracts with
tyrants, creditors should bear the risk of the transaction being repudiated.
153 AYITTEY, supra note 141, at 293.
154 Hanlon, supra note 128, § 1.
One-fifth of all developing country debt consists of loans given to prop up
compliant dictators. Mobutu, Marcos, Suharto and other notorious dictators were
propped up by massive loans. Even when they committed gross human rights
violations, were notoriously corrupt, and blatantly transferred money to Swiss
banks, the flow of loans continued.
Id.
155 Festos 0. Egwaikhide & Victor Adefemi Isumonah, Nigeria Paralysed: Socio-
Political Life under General Sani Abacha, 26 WORLD DEv. 219 (2001), available at
http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad3.2001/Isumonah.pdf; Elizabeth Olson,
Luxembourg Freezes Loot Abacha Took From Nigeria, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 10, 2000,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/05/1 0/abacha.2.t.php.
156 Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 129, at 82 (describing odious debt doctrine as
holding that "debt should not be transferable to successor regimes if (a) it was incurred
without the consent of the people and (b) was not for their benefit ... ").
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As a result, to the extent that a creditor seeks to enforce transaction terms
against later governments, the creditor should bear the burden of
demonstrating the substantive fairness of any underlying transactions and
uses of funds. This requirement should not be waivable.
Determining what constitutes tyrant debt will depend on identification
of characteristic features of tyrant governments. Indicia of tyranny in post-
colonial African contexts have been evident in the absence of a number of
institutions, including a free media, independent judiciary, and free
expression.157  Other indicators of tyranny in Africa have included
widespread rule by military regimes and oppressive single-party state
regimes. 158 Although the promise of greater security is at times used to
rationalize tyranny, the ascension of despots in the post-colonial context has
not, for example, significantly tempered violence in most contexts, and
persistent violence and civil war have become pervasive features of the
African sociopolitical topography. 159  From an economic perspective,
tyranny in Africa has been accompanied by significant economic
mismanagement, with a pattern emerging in many countries in which "elites
[a]re raiding the national treasury."' 60
Circumstances in which governments are characterized by significant
tyranny thus require fundamental reassessment of the role of sovereign
commercial obligations. This is particularly true because in such instances,
predatory tyrant behavior will in many cases pervade and reshape
institutions and transactions to suit the goals of leaders' predatory intent.
Tyrannical regimes reflect a clear case in which the obligations of past
governments with respect to debts should not necessarily bind future
governments. The presence of tyranny in such instances should be
measured by identifiable characteristics related to relative degrees of
political freedom and repression, the presence or absence of political
institutions that enable participation in or that effectuate actual transfer of
power, the independence of the judiciary, and other relevant factors.
C. Poor Country Debt: Lessons of Donegal v. Zambia
The case for repudiation of odious debts is clearest in the case of
157 AYITTEY, supra note 141, at 293.
' Id. at 293-94.
159 Tony Addison, Philippe Le Billon & S. Mansoob Murshed, Conflict in Africa: The
Cost of Peaceful Behavior, 11 J. AFR. EcON. 365 (2002); Ibrahim Elbaldawi & Nicholas
Sambanis, Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing
Violent Conflict, 9 J. AFR. EcON. 244 (2000).
160 AYITrEY, supra note 141, at 294. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
161 Jan Kees van Donge, The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba
and His Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between National Politics and the
International Drive Towards Good Governance, 108 AFR. AFF. 69, 70 (2008) (discussing
behavior that is predatory on the state).
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tyrannical regimes. African governments, however, even if not tyrannical,
have in the post-independence period had tendencies towards significant
predatory behaviors. The case for debt repudiation in such instances is less
clear because hallmark characteristics of tyranny, including a lack of
consent and representative government, may be absent or of less magnitude.
However, a common tendency to predation and scavenging exists in
tyrannical and non-tyrannical regimes in Africa and is manifest, for
example, in widespread corruption in many African countries that led the
African Union (AU) to adopt an African anticorruption convention in
2003.162 The AU Anticorruption Convention acknowledges the "negative
effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social and
cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the
economic and social development of the African peoples" and notes that
"corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the management
of public affairs as well as socio-economic development on the
continent."163 A number of African countries have adopted specific laws or
other measures intended to ameliorate problems of corruption. 1
64
While Zambia has been a fairly stable country relative to others in
Africa, it has reflected some characteristics of tyranny. 165 Kenneth Kaunda
and the United National Independence party governed Zambia from the
time of independence in 1964 for more than twenty years, ruling Zambia as
a one-party state from 1972 to 1991.166 In 1991, competitive party politics
returned to Zambia with the election of Frederick Chiluba under the mantle
of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.167 Chiluba ruled from 1991 to
2002, came to power as an anti-corruption fighter, but oversaw a highly
corrupt regime. 68 In 2007, Chiluba and other defendants were found in
162 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Maputo, July
11, 2003, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties_%
20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention%20on%20Combating%2OCorruption.pdf.
163 Id. (setting forth rational for Convention in preamble).
164 ECON. COMM. AFR., supra note 72, at 35 (noting steps taken to curb corruption in a
number of African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania Sudan,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
165 Richard L. Sklar, Democracy in Africa, 26 AFR. STUD. REv. 11, 17 (1983) (noting
tendency to development of developmental dictatorship in Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda).
166 van Donge, supra note 161, at 73 (noting that the United National Independence Party
ruled from the time of independence in 1964 until 1991, and as a one-state party from 1972
onwards).
167 Id.; Zambia v. Meer Care, & Desai & Ors, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 952, [442], [2007] All
E.R. (D) 97, available at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC
/Ch/2007/952.html&query=zambia+and+meer&method=boolean (noting the election of
Chiluba on an anticorruption ticket).
168 van Donge, supra note 161, at 73-74 (noting significant economic decline in Zambia
in post-independence period and implications of stealing from the government for foreign
aid).
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U.K. court proceedings to have stolen some forty six million dollars
through two London law firms.' 16 9  The Chiluba regime, although
democratically elected, was manifestly corrupt. The U.K. court in the
Zambian corruption case noted: "The people of Zambia will know that
whenever FJT [Chiluba] appears in public wearing a smart handmade suit
or a pair of his 'signature' shoes that they were acquired by stealing money
from the people the vast majority of whom live at subsistence levels."' 7
Despite the presence of predatory rulers,' 17 however, Zambia has had a
tradition of successful democratic protest in the post-independence era,1
72
that has implications for treatment of Zambian debt held by vulture
investors.
The Donegal court's interpretation of the relative obligations of
Zambia and Donegal, in light of the facts of the case and applicable legal
standards, is not unreasonable. 173 The Donegal case, however, suggests that
better legal doctrine needs to be established with respect to transactions
entered into by predatory and scavenging sovereigns. One potential avenue
for challenging transactions made by predatory but non-tyrannical regimes
could be based on a conception of negative duty as elucidated by Thomas
Pogge and others. 74  Under such assumptions, legal doctrine governing
transactions between predatory sovereigns and developed world actors
would embed negative duties that could be violated in instances of
transactions involving governments of affluent countries. This means that
criteria for repudiation of debts should in some instances extend to
transactions with non-tyrants. More specifically, negative duties could
permit repudiation in circumstances in which actors such as vulture
investors collaborate with ruling cliques in poor countries in certain types of
transactions. Transactions that might merit greater scrutiny could include
ones that exclude or divert benefits from the population, allocate benefits of
commercial or other transactions disproportionately towards those in power
or engage in other activities that serve to intensify poverty of many who
169 Meer Care, supra note 167, at paras. 443, 1119-40 (noting claims against former
president Chiluba of up to three million dollars in corruption case).
170 Id. at para. 467.
171 Peter Bumell, The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past,
Present and Future, 100 AFR. AFF. 239, 251 (2001) (noting the ruling party's ability to
reinforce its position by manipulating public resources).
172 van Donge, supra note 161, at 73. See generally Lee M. Habasonda, The Military,
Civil Society and Democracy in Zambia, 11 AFR. SECURITY REv. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/ASR/I1 No2/Habasonda.html (noting the growing tradition of
civil society activism in Zambia).
173 Salmon, supra note 136.
174 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1, 3-4
(2005). See also Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications
for International Trade and Tax Law (Nw. Pub. L. Res., Paper No. 08-43, 2008), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract - 1319465.
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live within the poor country, while benefiting a small minority of the
powerful or connected.
Doctrine derived from obligations to the poor of such countries would
no doubt apply to Zambia. Zambian annual per capita GDP, which was
$307 in 1999, $314 in 2000, and $391 in 2003, increased to $917 in
2006.175 Fluctuations in Zambian GDP have historically largely reflected
changes in the world price of copper. 176 Each year between 1991 and 1998,
the percentage of the Zambian population living in poverty ranged from
69.2% to 72.9% of the population, with 53.2% to 60.6% being categorized
as living in extreme poverty. 177 The implications of even a payment as
seemingly small as fifteen million dollars to Donegal by Zambia are
potentially quite significant in magnitude in Zambian terms. Although not
directly paid by the Zambian poor, payments of such amounts displace
funding that could otherwise be spent on critical health care, education,
infrastructure, and other needs. The Donegal debt award not including
interest is approximately $4.62 per capita based on 2006 Zambian
population figures, 178 which is more than the $3.68 per capita that Zambian
households spent on health care in 2002.179 The amount awarded to
Donegal represented close to nine percent of total 2002 Zambian health
expenditures of $179 million. 180
At a minimum, relationships between creditors and poor nations in the
African context require greater understanding and mechanisms intended to
reduce incentives to scavenge by external vultures or internal hyenas. In
addition, the identities of investors in private equity funds that seek to profit
from secondary markets in sovereign debt should in all instances be
revealed. The identity of the underlying owners who might profit from
Donegal's collection of the Zambian debt remains unclear, for example, in
175 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008,
Zambia, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1999&
ey=2013 &scsm-1 &ssd= 1 &sort=country&ds=.&br=1 &c=754&s=NGDPDPC&grp=0&a = &
pr.x=55&pr.y=5#csl (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
176 Shantayanan Devarajan & Delfin S. Go, The 123PRSP Model, in THE IMPACT OF
ECONOMIC POLICIES ON POVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: EVALUATION TECHNIQUES AND
TOOLS 291 (Frangois Bourguignon & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva eds., 2003) ("Changes in
Zambia's GDP can be traced almost completely to changes in the world price of copper
(except for a brief period between 1970 and 1974).").
177 SAVE THE CHILDREN SWEDEN & INST. FOR DEMOCRACY IN S. AFR. (IDASA), CHILDREN
AND THE BUDGET IN ZAMBIA 10 (2004), available at www.idasa.org.za/gb
OutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID = 1138.
178 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: ZAMBIA (Jan. 2009),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2359.htm (giving estimated 2006 Zambian population as
11.9 million)
179 FELIX PHIRI & MARIE TIEN, ZAMBIAN NATIONAL HEALTH ACCOUNTS 2002: MAIN
FINDINGS 7 (Zambian Ministry of Health 2004).
180 Id.
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the Donegal case. Secrecy in such instances can magnify scavenging by
creating incentives for insiders to create seemingly independent third party
entities as a new mechanism for exploitation. Consequently, a minimum
requirement of transparency and disclosure of the structure of entities that
own sovereign debt and all affiliates, including identity of all investors,
should be required in any actions that seek to enforce sovereign debt
obligations.
Commercial relationships with countries in Africa may embed legal
interpretations concerning enforceability of contracts documenting loan
transactions that in the worst instances may magnify conditions of tyranny
and extreme poverty. The institutional contexts within which commercial
transactions occur should be fully considered and more appropriate legal
doctrine and interpretations developed to take account of the realities of
such contexts. Discussions of odious debt reflect noteworthy and important
attempts to use contract law interpretations and other legal doctrine to
address legal issues presented in cases of tyrant and poor country debt.
The Donegal-Zambia case offers an example of a transaction that
would likely be a simpler one in the context of a developed country
distressed debtor. However, the operation of vulture private equity
investors using tactics that might be similar in some respects to those used
with distressed companies takes on radically different significance in the
context of countries ravaged by internal scavengers that may include tyrant
rulers and in some instances corrupt segments of ruling elites. In such
contexts, commercial relationships with external parties should be
structured and enforced so as to minimize opportunities to reproduce
institutional structures that facilitate tyranny and egregious corruption that
exacerbate or contribute to human suffering in the poorest regions of the
world.
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